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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR W. DECKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case was commenced on or about June 13, 1973 
when Defendant notified Plaintiff that a hearing would 
be held to determine whether Plaintiff had violated Sec-
tion 35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Hearings were held in Phoenix, Arizona on September 
6,1973 and October 11,1973 before Hearing Officer W. M. 
Haskell and decisions were entered on the evidence pre-
sented as set out below. 
I Case No. 
I 13838 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant, through its Board of Review, affirmed 
previous decisions of the Department of Employment 
Security and the Appeals Referee finding that Plaintiff 
had violated Section 35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, by knowingly failing to report material 
facts about his work and earnings and therefore Plaintiff 
is liable for the sum of $2,229.00 paid to him during his 
disqualification period. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff prays that the Court reverse the decision 
of the Defendant's Board of Review based on the record 
herein, or in the alternative, reverse and remand to the 
Defendant for a new hearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case centers around an Interstate claim for un-
employment benefits filled out by the Plaintiff in 
Phoenix, Arizona on September 1, 1972. This claim is 
at Pages 50 and 51 of the Record. (Reference to the 
Record will be made in the form R- Page Number, such 
as R-50, 51.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff wilfully 
withheld material facts on that claim by stating that he 
did not work or earn wages during the prior weeks end-
ing August 19, 1972 and August 26, 1972. Plaintiff admits 
filling out the claim on September 1, 1972. Plaintiff 
further admits that he worked for H & R Transfer and 
Storage Co. of Phoenix, Arizona part-time during the 
weeks ending August 19, 1972 and August 26, 1972 (R-
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39). However, Plaintiff was not paid for this work until 
after September 1, 1972 the date he filed his claim (R-
40). Plaintiff reported to the Deputy assisting him in 
preparing the claim that he had worked but didn't know 
the amount earned since he hadn't been paid. Plaintiff 
was then instructed to wait until he was paid before 
reporting the wages earned, and consequently he an-
swered the question as to earnings in the negative (R-
39). 
Defendant thereafter received a Report of Earnings 
from Plaintiff's employer stating that Plaintiff had 
worked during the weeks ending August 19 and August 
26 and that Plaintiff had been paid on August 18, August 
19 and August 30th. Defendant initiated hearings to 
deteormine whether Plaintiff had violated Section 35-4-
5(e) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Two hear-
ings were held in Phoenix, Arizona and testimony from 
Plaintiff and from an employee of the Arizona Depart-
ment of Employment Security was taken. Certain docu-
ments were also introduced into evidence. Based on this 
evidence the Defendant's Department Representative 
ruled against the Plaintiff. This decision was affirmed 
by the Defendant's Appeals Referee and by the Defen-
dant's Board of Review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
EVIDENCE NOT CLEAR AND CONVINC-
ING. 
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To prove a case of fraud this Court has held that 
the evidence must be clear and convincing. Perry v. 
McConkie, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953). This 
Court has further held that when one is charged with 
a falsehood or misrepresentation, in order for it to be 
actionable or to deprive him of a right, it must be done 
wilfully and knowingly. Marks v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P. 2d 387 (1967). 
In the instant case the evidence falls far short of 
being clear or convincing the trier of fact that Plaintiff 
wilfully and knowingly failed to report a material fact. 
Rather the evidence reveals that the form Plaintiff filled 
out is, at least with regard to permitting Plaintiff to 
truly reflect his circumstances at the time of filling it 
out, inadequate. Defendant has presented no evidence 
as to the instructions given to Plaintiff in filling out the 
form. Only Plaintiff has testified as to the instructions 
received. Defendant has offered testimony from an Ari-
zona Deputy as to his normal procedure, but this evi-
dence only reveals how cursory and inadequate the in-
structions given to claimants are (R-24 to 29). 
A. Form is Inadequate. 
The Form in question is at pp. 50 and 51 of the 
Record. Question 10 of the form asks "During the 
week (s) claimed in No. 7 and No. 8 above, did you work 
or earn wages of any kind?". Plaintiff answered "no". 
The question makes no allowance for Plaintiff's situation 
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where he did work but was not paid. Plaintiff therefore 
sought direction and was told to wait and report the 
wages earned when they were paid. The Board of Re-
view makes much over the fact that under question 10 
there is provision for NO. of HOURS WORKED in large 
letters (See R-4). The Board plainly feels that Plain-
tiff's failure to fill out this particular column is damning. 
However, a reading of Question 10 shows that one would 
only proceed to that column if Question 10 were an-
swered "yes". Since Plaintiff responded "no" he would 
naturally skip to the next question. 
The Board further makes much of the fact that on 
September 5, 1972 when Plaintiff filled out his next form 
he reported $16.00 earned from a James Taylor (R-5). 
Plaintiff has never denied that he knew how to complete 
the form when he had worked and been paid. He was 
paid cash by Mr. Taylor prior to September 5, 1972 (R-
42). Consequently, he so indicated on the Form (R-59). 
Plaintiff's difficulty with the Form was when he had not 
been paid his wages. 
B. Instruction was Inadequate. 
The instruction given to Plaintiff upon filling out 
the Form on September 1, 1972 is perhaps the key ele-
ment in this case. The Defendant presented the testi-
mony of a Mr. David Reyes of the Arizona Employment 
Security Commission (R-24 et seq.). Mr. Reyes first of 
all testified that he had no recollection of interviewing 
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the Plaintiff (R-29). He further testified that he pro-
cesses 400 to 500 claimants per week or 80 to 100 per 
day (R-28). He further testified that he does not orally 
interview the applicants (R-26). From this evidence it 
can foe seen that the interviews, of necessity, are ex-
tremely brief and instruction offered is almost non-ex-
istent. Such a procedure is entirely consistent with 
Plaintiff's testimony that he was told to wait until he 
had been paid and then report the wages earned. Mr. 
Reyes testified that if a claimant has not been paid he 
is sent to another Deputy who would interview the claim-
ant and if necessary call the employer. While this may 
be the ideal procedure, in reality, when 80-100 claimants 
are processed daily by one deputy, it is more believable 
that a claimant would be told to report the earnings 
when they are received. 
C. Hearsay Evidence. 
Essential portions of the Defendant's case rely on 
hearsay evidence which cannot be clear and convincing 
evidence. Defendant contends that Plaintiff was paid 
prior to September 1, 1972 and therefore knowingly mis-
represented the facts on the Form. Defendant relies on 
a Report of Earnings prepared by the Controller of H 
& R Transfer and Storage Co. (R-52, 53). This report 
is hearsay. Plaintiff had no opportunity to cross-examine 
the Controller. 
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Consequently there is no waj of knowing whether 
the dates under "date paid" mean date the checks were 
written, date they were mailed, date the expense was 
entered on the books, etc. 
Defendant further relies on the hearsay evidence 
of a Laura May Jassin to prove that Plaintiff received 
a copy of Claimant's Handbook (R-58). This is actually 
hearsay upon hearsay, the out of court word of Mrs. 
Jassin interpreting the out of court statements of a per-
son identified as "L. L." 
To base a firidic ul iVaud on si ich hearsay when 
the burden is clear arul convincing evidence is to deny 
Plaintiff the most elementary and basic rights guaran-
teed by constitutional due process. 
PLAINTIFF DENIED SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
:"'luii.:lit lias \h ;-u assessed liability for $2,229.00 on 
the grounds thai hi* knowingly withheld information 
that he had earnings for the weeks ending August 19 
and August 26th. If there were fraud here the damage 
to the State would be no more than two weeks benefits 
at $77.00 per week, or $154.00. There has been no show-
ing that Plaintiff was not entitled to the $77.00 per week 
for fae 50 week period, beginning with September 1, 
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1972 and it must be presumed that he was entitled to 
those benefits. 
If the State is going to assess liability of $2,229.00 
for damages of $154.00 it would seem, first of all, that 
the level of proof required should at least match the seri-
ousness of the penalty. In the instant case Plaintiff is 
is subject to deprivation of property on the basis of hear-
say evidence and speculation. 
Secondly, this penalty violates the protection af-
forded by substantive due process. Although the State 
has wide discretion in sotting penalties for violation of 
its laws it is still bound by due process. A penalty that 
is wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously 
unreasonable violates due process. St. Louis, I. M. & S. 
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U. S, 63, 64 L. Ed. 139, 40 S. 
Ct. 71. In the present case if Plaintiff was guilty of 
fraud it would be to the extent of $154.00. To penalize 
Plaintiff by assessing the amount of $2,229.00 against him 
is wholly disproportionate to his offense and violates his 
guarantee of constitutional due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's evidence is based in great part on hear-
say. Defendant has offered no evidence as to how Plain-
tiff was instructed to fill out the Form. This evidence 
falls far short of the required clear and convincing proof. 
Moreover, Defendant is attempting to assess a penalty 
against Plaintiff that has no reasonable relationship to 
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the offense allegedly committed by Plaintiff. Therefore, 
the decision of Defendant's Board of Review must be 
reversed or reversed and remanded for a new hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of January, 1975. 
SPENCE-MOORE, LTD. 
By 
WILLIAM M. SPENCE 
800 Luhrs Bldg. 
11 W. Jefferson 
Phoenix, Arizona 85003 
By 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
1401 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copy of the foregoing mailed/delivered this 2nd day 
of January, 1975 to: 
Mr. Edgar M. Denny 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
174 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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